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40 Commentary 
Commentary I Edward L. Ayers 
Without a second and unarmed, I have no inclination to offer a 
fundamental challenge to Professor Bowman's argument or his 
character. In fact, he has served us well by focusing on honor, 
martialism, and dueling as indices of comparison between the 
antebellum planters and the pre-1848 Junkers. I would like to 
build on the wealth of detail he has provided to help clarify the 
larger comparison between the South and Prussia, a comparison 
that has consumed so much of our energies over the last decade. 
We might begin by distinguishing more carefully among the 
three related phenomena Professor Bowman discusses, for each 
tells us something different about the two societies we are trying to 
understand. Better than most things we could ~xamine, dueling 
assumed recognizably similar forms in both the South and Prussia, 
was considered a signal institution of both regions, elicited consid-
erable contemporary comment, and evolved in ways that allow us 
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to use it as a barometer of the planters' and Junkers' sense of 
themselves. On the other hand, while martialism provided much 
of the impetus and context for dueling in Prussia, the southern 
attraction for martial values had only a brief opportunity to attach 
itself to a powerful military establishment. As a result, southern 
martialism necessarily remained more a cultural predisposition 
than an entrenched way of life. Honor, the larger culture in which 
both dueling and militarism were embedded, was more than the 
sum of its parts; it remains, after many studies, an elusive, com-
plex, and problematic concept. 
Besides breaking the topic down into distinct components, I 
would also like to set it in motion in a way that Professor Bowman 
did not attempt. One of the most challenging things about com-
parative history is that our targets are more likely than not moving 
at different speeds and maybe even in different directions. I would 
like to use that challenge as an opportunity to examine change 
rather than merely to freeze two societies in time in order to 
compare some essence they may or may not have shared over 
several decades. 
Let me begin with a brief sketch of the evolution of the Junkers 
that will take us somewhat beyond Professor Bowman's focus. The 
landowners of Prussia experienced many hard times from the 
fifteenth century on, as they were buffeted by the vicissitudes of 
commercial agriculture, by an unstable political environment, by 
devastating military defeats, by a restive peasantry. Fortunately for 
tpe Junkers, though, in the eighteenth century they joined in a 
tight alliance with the state, which they served as officials and as 
officers. They survived as a class through all the vicissitudes of the 
nineteenth century, in fact, largely because they were so deeply 
attached to the state, an attachment that grew stronger in the face 
of the challenges of the new century. 
After the defeat of the Prussian-led army by Napoleon at Jena in 
1806 and the attendant end of serfdom and beginning of free trade 
in land and estates, the Junkers maintained their strategic position 
in the military. As increasing numbers of civil positions went to 
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better-educated commoners, the Junkers of Prussia channeled 
their poorly educated sons into the military in astonishing propor-
tions. Even as the Junkers' economic power dwindled in the early 
decades of the nineteenth century, their sons found proud sanctu-
ary in the army. As one observer wrote in 1846, "when he gets a 
small beard, when the epaulettes for the first time flourish on his 
shoulders, when the plume for the first time waves from his head, 
when the soldiers in all comers present arms, how should he not 
feel that he is predestined to represent a 'higher being' in this 
world?"1 
After 1848 the Prussian nobility saw further erosion of their 
ancient power over the rural folk among whom they lived and held 
on to their position in the army even more tenaciously. In the 
turmoil, the Junkers championed the army as the only true guar-
antor of order and justice; because the revolution left much of the 
old order intact the Prussians were able to dominate the powerful 
army in the 1860s and 1870s as they had in the 1830s and 1840s. 
Moreover, when the Junkers made an economic comeback in the 
last third of the nineteenth century they cultivated their self-
consciously archaic ways, aided by the weight and privilege of 
their noble titles. Even as young noblemen took middle-class 
wives, they assimilated the commoners into the ethos of the 
military, "feudalized" them (creating a topic of much discussion in 
the society pages of American newspapers along the way, who 
were outraged that so many of our best young women were opting 
for marriages to dessicated European noblemen}. The military 
schools of Prussia, meanwhile, dwelt on honor and military virtues 
at the expenses of other teaching. 
History, in other words, seemed to be running backward east of 
the Elbe: industrialists were becoming ennobled and the ideals of 
the Enlightenment eroded even as the Junkers were becoming 
ever more deeply engaged in the international capitalist market. 
Perhaps the greatest testimony to the growing gap between an 
eroded personalism on the estates and a continued tradition of 
personal honor came late in the century; in those years, nearly two 
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million rural laborers left the Prussian provinces and the Junkers 
turned to distinctly non-feudal, transitory, imported labor-yet 
the landlords preserved their traditional place in the Prussian 
bureaucracy and in the military. In 1900, 61 percent of its officers 
were noblemen, and the higher the officer the more likely he was 
to be of the oldest and most honorable families. In other words, 
honor seemed to inhere far more in modern bureaucratic and 
military structures than in archaic relationships between estate 
owners and their workers. 
The contrasts with the history of the southern planters are 
striking. The well-known analogies between the postwar planters 
and the Junkers have been drawn because of their reactionary 
domination over an agricultural region during an era when the 
larger society was undergoing rapid industrialization. This brief 
sketch makes it clear that the Junkers had far greater success in 
adapting the new social order to their ideals and purposes than the 
postwar planters could even have hoped. After emancipation, the 
planters saw no further concerted attack on their plantations, but 
in every other facet oflife they saw a precipitous and steady erosion 
of their power and influence. Once southern lawmakers granted 
planters the power of the lien in the 1870s, the landlords asked for 
little else from their state and national governments other than to 
be left alone. They were. Despite a few sentimental and overtly 
nostalgic novels and songs, the cultural power of the planters 
evaporated in the New South; the tides of change were on the side 
.of the town dwellers, with their attachment to the emerging mass 
culture and mass economy of Gilded Age America. The sons and 
daughters of the planters married into the families of merchants 
and professionals and moved to town-not the other way around. 
The tiny professional army of the United States, the army that 
southerners still associated with their defeat, offered small refuge. 
The churches saw a new differentiation by class as well as by race, 
as common people created their own congregations, out of the 
reach of the planters. 
The evolution of the planters and the Junkers across the nine-
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teenth century shows, in other words, how intimately the planter 
class's power and identity were tied to slavery, not merely the 
plantation or even to race. The planters, unlike the Junkers, 
enjoyed no important role in the national government or military, 
no hereditary nobility, no ties of sentiment to a monarch. When 
slavery was gone, the planters had no other institution in which 
they could find refuge. 
The history of dueling is the clearest example of this cultural 
dimension of class domination and testifies to the deep differences 
between the two landholding classes. Let me briefly trace the 
evolution of dueling in their societies. It seems that the heyday of 
the southern duel came in the 1830s and 1840s, here on the cotton 
frontier. Yet the practice fell under steady and increasing attack, 
and the 1850s may well have seen a decline in the practice. We see 
relatively little evidence of dueling in the Confederacy, as the 
elective officer corps undermined some of the rationale for dueling 
and as Christian soldiers such as Lee and Jackson clearly stood 
above the practice. The postwar years saw a steady diminution of 
dueling, even though a few famous conflicts appeared among the 
other kinds of violence that quickly became synonymous with the 
New South. Within a generation after Appomattox, the southern 
duel was a thing of the past. 
Not so in Prussia. There, the duel flourished during the same 
decades it flourished in the antebellum South-and then· con-
tinued to flourish, even as Germany experienced some of the most 
rapid industrial growth in Europe. In fact, as Bowman points out, 
dueling actually spread from the military and the university to 
politics after the reforms of 1848, when an elected assembly was 
established. As a recent account observes, "duelling continued to 
be practiced on quite a substantial scale in Protestant Prussia, not 
only among students but also among army officers, officers of the 
reserve, civilian aristocrats and impeccably bourgeois profession-
als such as doctors, dentists and apothecaries well into the twen-
tieth century. "2 The mention of students in this passage is signifi-
cant, for the universities of the South had nothing like the dueling 
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societies of Germany. As the century drew to a close, as ritualized 
dueling and scarred cheeks proliferated in German universities 
and as the universities overtook the army as the major dis-
seminator of dueling in Prussia, southern universities rushed in-
stead to adopt football, with its more diffuse and flamboyant (and in 
the early years of the sport in what was to become the SEC, 
deadly) use of the violent impulse and quest for collective honor. 
Why the difference? Why the persistence of the duel in Prussia 
and its atrophy in the South? It seems clear that, as the Prussian 
Road analogy argues, both the planters and the Junkers were in 
some ways anomalous classes, taking their identity from their local 
privilege and power while remaining in tension with the larger 
structures of their nation states. Early in their histories, both 
relied on the whip and the gun to control their subalterns, even as 
both spoke in a language of paternalism and noblesse oblige. Both 
subsequently had to contend with upheavals oflabor and politics, 
and both found their values challenged by the spokesmen ofliberal 
democracy. Both had to trim their ambitions to fit national political 
realities over which they had limited control. 
The major difference is that the more extreme Prussians, with all 
their heavy baggage of manners and power, were better able to 
adapt to change than the planters, with their carry-on bag of 
tradition (a bag that contained evangelical Protestantism and ideals 
of representative government as well as traditions of domination). 
The death of the duel in the South reveals how little integrity and 
weight the planters had outside of slavery. While antebellum 
politics had in many ways turned around slavery, the planters had 
no special body in the national government-as did the Prus-
sians-they could use to harness or soften the change that swept 
over them. Southerners hardly dominated the United States Army 
in the decades after their defeat, and even if they had the army was 
of little cultural importance in America. 
Such institutions were vital-and this is the key-for in both 
the South and in Prussia honor was not some naive holdover from a 
"traditional" culture. Instead, it was something that had to be self-
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consciously constructed and maintained. That it could be main-
tained even in the face of industrial capitalism is made clear by the 
German experience; modernity was not some unitary substance, 
some all-encompassing and internally consistent ethos that tri-
umphed over everything in its path. But without the sense of 
confidence and common identity fostered by some institution 
more exclusive and ennobling than sharecropping or a motley 
Democratic party, the planters could not muster the energy for 
dueling, could not maintain a proud and bristling honor. And could 
not dominate the New South culturally or ideologically. 
Which brings us to a final twist. The Junkers managed to lend 
the ancient values of honor a new, if temporary, lease on life, 
leading the dentists and pharmacists of Prussia to the dueling 
ground. That would seem to suggest that the Junkers were a 
dominant reactionary class in modern Germany, a class that lent 
much of its style and many of its values to the Germany of the 
twentieth century. Indeed, the notion that Germany followed a 
unique, and tragic, path to industrial capitalism, a path tortuously 
winding through authoritarianism and archaic militarism, a path 
that began in Prussia, has become an article of faith-and the 
foundation of a whole genre of southern history. The notion of that 
Prussian Road was part of a critical wave of historiography emerg-
ing after World War II that sought to counteract the conservative 
tradition of modern German history that dissociated· the Third 
Reich from earlier eras of German history. As such, it served a 
salutary and noble purpose. But in the 1980s a new and influential 
revisionist school in German history has expressed skepticism 
about applying an implicit model of"modernization" drawn from 
American social science and an idealized version of British and 
French history to every other country in the world. As a leader in 
this revision puts it, "I have become more skeptical over the years 
about the version of continuity in modern German history that 
relentlessly catalogues the malign role played by pre-industrial 
elites and institutions .... We hear too much about the Germany 
of the spiked helmet and too little about top-hatted Germany, ... 
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too much about the power of a pre-industrial elite and too little 
about the effects of capitalism in structuring German society and 
politics. "3 This revisionist school seeks a broader vision of Ger-
many's path to Hitler, one that does not allow the easy solution of 
blaming it on the Junkers, one that does not stop large parts of 
history. We do not have to accept all its arguments and implications 
(and I do not) to see that it throws the concept of the Prussian Road 
into doubt even as it applied to Germany. 
Just as revisionists want to stress the role of groups other than 
Junkers in modern German history, so do I think our focus on the 
power of the planters obscures how much else was going on in the 
postwar South, how many other groups played their role in making 
the New South what it was, good and bad. Our fixation on the 
postwar planters obscures, most importantly for the discussion at 
hand, the recognition that honor was not the planters' exclusive 
preserve. Honor was not merely "ambivalent," as Bowman would 
stress, it was multivalent, highly inflected. It had powerful mean-
ing to groups other than those at the top of the social order. In fact, 
as I have argued elsewhere, honor died from the top down in the 
New South-where druggists and dentists never thought of duel-
ing (the very idea sounds like one of Faulkner's satires). Honor 
apparently stayed alive, though, among the black communities of 
the urban South and among the mountain communities of Ap-
palachia. Both these groups lived in a world increasingly inte-
grated into America's state and economy, but in the late nine-
te~nth century took many of their values and actions from one 
another rather than from the mass society. And part of those values 
included the honor-driven but less stylized violence that was 
always far more common in the South than in militaristic Prussia. I 
believe honor was created anew in segregated Southern neigh-
borhoods and in mountain hollows as well as in the Prussian 
military and fraternities. By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
planters and Junkers were among the least likely groups in their 
societies to be engaged in personal violence. 
In sum, the comparison of the Prussian and Southern experi-
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ence with honor and dueling suggests that we abandon some of the 
snug teleological conceptions of economy, class, and culture that 
so often distort comparative history. Neither the planters nor the 
Junkers were simple preindustrial classes, but constantly negoti-
ated among contradictory demands and aspirations, modem and 
archaic; more than this, neither the New South nor post-1848 
Prussia were mere holdovers from an older age, drifting through 
history. As unfortunate as it may be, it seems that the violence of 
honor was not merely the product of some discredited fragment 
within otherwise progressive societies, but changed its form and 
~ubstance with dismaying ease in societies deep in the change of 
the nineteenth century. When we set comparative history into 
motion, the enterprise becomes even more challenging and dis-
concerting-and maybe that is the way comparative history can 
serve us best. 
